Bootstrapping and Volunteerism: The Labor Market Solution to Poverty by Shulenburger, David E.
KU ScholarWorks | http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
Bootstrapping and Volunteerism: The 
Labor Market Solution to Poverty
1982
by David E. Shulenburger
This work has been made available by the University of Kansas 
Libraries’ Office of Scholarly Communication and Copyright.
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this article benefits you.
This is the published version of the article, made available with the 
permission of the publisher.  The original published version can be 
found at the link below.
 Shulenburger, David E. “Bootstrapping and Volunteerism: The Labor 
Market Solution to Poverty,”   The 1982 Annual Byron T. Schutz Award 
and Lecturer for Distinguished Teaching on Economic Systems, printed 
by the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University of 
Kansas, October 26, 1982.
Terms of Use: http://www2.ku.edu/~scholar/docs/license.shtml
BOOTSTRAPPING AND
VOLUNTEERISM:
THE LABOR MARKET
SOLUTION TO POVERTY
Address by
DAVID E. SHULENBURGER
Associate Professor of Business
The Byron T. Shutz Award and Lecture
The University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
October 26, 1982
The Byron T. Shutz Award
for
Distinguished Teaching on Economic systems
. fl: Byron T. shutz Award was established by Mr. shutzin 1978 to stimulate distinguished teaching in the fields of
economics and business at the university oIKansas. Award_
ees are chosen from the faculties in business, economics,
political science, and related areas for the quality of their
teaching about the strengths and weaknessis, the advan-
taggg and disadvantages of the American economic system.
The honored teacher receives an honorarium of bz,o0o
and delivers a public address.
YI. Prron T. Shutz of Kansas City, Mo., was a student atthe University in- 1918 1nd 1919, 6ut left to support hismother after [he death of his father. He joined th'e'Herbert
Jones and Co. realtors as a salesman, and .ose to a partner-
ship, becoming president in 1944. ln 1973 he became chair-
man of the Byron T. shutz Co., reartors and mortgage
bankers.
Mr. shutz has served his profession as president of the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, ind his commu-
litX. through the American Red Cross and Kansas CityPhilharmonic, among others.
For his service to society, the university of Kansas in 1963
conferred on Mr. shutz its Citation for Distinguishej s"*_
ice, its highest recognition for lifetime serviceio society.
Previous Shutz Awardees
1979-Anthony L. Redwood, Associate professor, The uni-
versity of Kan'sas School of Business.
1980-Anthony M. Marino, Associate professor, The univer-
sity of Kansas-School of Business.
1981-Malcolm R. Burns, Assistant professor, The Univer-
sity of Kansas Department of Economics.
David E. Shulenburger
David E. Shulenburger, associate professor of business at
the University of Kansas, has been named the fourth recip-
ient of the Byron T. Shutz Award for Distinguished Teaching
on Economic Systems.
Shulenburger, also recently named director of the School
of Business undergraduate program, received his bachelor of
arts degree in 1967 from Lenoir Rhyne College in Hickory,
N.C., and his master's and doctoral degrees from the
University of Illinois in 1968 and 1974, respectively. He
began teaching at the University of Kansas rn 1974.
In Augu st 1982, Shulenburger concluded work as project
director on a $520,000 U.S. Department of Labor grant
project that involved developing a Human Resources Pro-
gram in the Business School. The program established an
evaluation system to track the cost of C.E.T.A. training for
employees in the state.
As director of the undergraduate program in business,
Shulenburger is responsible for the organization and man-
agement of the undergraduate curriculum. He teaches
courses in labor relations, labor economics, the economic
system, business economics, minority employment prob-
lems, collective bargaining, human resource program eval-
uation, human resources management, and the labor
workshop.
Shulenburger has published numerous articles on such
topics as wage differential, wage negotiations, earnings
impact on employment and family, minority employment
issues, and management techniques. He currently serves as
a fact-finder for the Kansas Public Employee Relations Board
and as a fact-finder and adjudicator for a similar board in
Iowa. He has been a consultant for several firms and
government agencies.
Receipt of the Byron T. Shutz award is a career highlight
for anyone at the University of Kansas who teaches about
the U.S. economic system. I wish to thank Mr. Shutz for
establishing the award. Our daily lives are so directly im-
pacted by economic events that every citizen should and
would benefit from knowing more about this field. The
encouragement which this award gives to those who teach
economics will enhance the effort to spread that knowledge.
Tonight I wish to apply some of the knowledge which
economists have gained from their last decade and one-half
of exploring the functioning of the labor market. My objec-
tives are to explore the relationships between work, poverty,
and welfare and then to determine whether our current
national policy, which relies upon work to reduce poverty,
will achieve that end.
Let me begin by establishing some ground rules. I will
define poverty as that condition which exists when an
individual or family unit has an income level which is below
the Department of Health and Human Services official
poverty-level income. I am aware that controversy exists
about this definition, but I believe that controversy will
surround any definition of a social phenomenon such as
poverty. The real focus of this discussion is on improving the
human condition. By accepting the official poverty level as a
definition, I am essentially making the judgment that in-
creasing income beyond very meager levels will tend to
improve the human condition.
The second ground rule is that my discussion will focus
only on those adults and near adults in the poverty popula-
tion who are physically, mentally, and emotionally capable
of working. The labor market cannot address the problems
of poverty for those people who cannot participate in it.
In spite of belonging to a profession which was first
characterized as the "dismal science," economists can some-
times be overwhelmingly optimistic. For example Robert J.
Lampman, writing in an article published in the American
Economic Reaiew in 1964, stated that "past experience pro-
vides a basis for the belief that poverty can be eliminated in
the U. S. in this generation. The poverty rate has been
reduced at the rate of one percentage point a year. . . ."
Since, when he wrote his article the poverty rate stood at
L9.0 percent, in only twenty years-one generation (by
1985)-the poverty rate, by simple arithmetic projection,
would become zero. Indeed, Lampman was nearly pro-
phetic, for by 1973 the proportion of citizens living below the
poverty level stood at 11.L percent of the population. This
was a reduction of 8.9 percentage points in just eight years,
greater than his target reduction rate of 1 percentage point
per year. After 1973, however, the rate ceased to decline,
and by 1981 the poverty rate had risen from its low of 11.1
percent up to 13 percent.
What has happened? Is the dream unattainable? Shall we
have, to quote a noneconomist, " . . . the poor with us
always' '?
President Reagan has called upon Americans to work
harder and to pull themselves up by their bootstraps out of
poverty. He has also called upon American business through
volunteerism to assist the poor in that effort.
In addition to these two exhortations, which I wish to
examine later, the remainder of the President's program for
e-lim_i11ting poverty was enunciated by an undersecietary of
the U.S. Department of Labor when asked why there were
no new anti-poverty programs being proposed by cabinet-
level agencies. This undersecretary iesponded thit the ad-
ministration's economic program is its anti-poverty pro-
gram-that the prosperity brought about by thelhree-year 30
percent tax cut would effectively reduce poverty. More
colorfully he added, "A rising tide lifts all sliips." -
I will not attempt to judge whether the President's
economic program will cause the tide to rise or even whether
it will lead to economic prosperity; I will discuss whether the
"rising tide" theory, as a means to reducing poverty, can
work. In fact, I believe that it is the most effective anti-
poverty weapon known.
From 1960 until 1973, the poverty rate was cut precisely
in half-from 22.2 percent to 11. 1 percent. During this
economic golden age, 1960 to 1973, the real output of the
economy (GNP) grew at an annually compounded rate of
4.177 percent per year. The growth rate for this period was
more than one-third greater than the U.S. long-term growth
rate of 3.05 percent over the last 50 years.
While the rapidly rising ship of the economy certainly
deserves much of the credit for poverty reduction during this
period, the slowly rising ship of economic performance
resulted in no decrease in poverty after 1973. From 1973 to
1981, the economy grew only 2.3 percent per year, on the
average, as the poverty rate began to rise. Since 1980 our
economy has hardly grown at all in real terms, while the
poverty rate has absolutely increased.
Most observers agree that the robust economy of the 1960
to 1973 period is due most of the credit for poverty reduction
which occurred then. This is not to say that President
]ohnson's war on poverty did not help. Certainly it aided
some. The civil rights act of 1964 also helped minority group
individuals. These two programs desirably affectea in-e ais-
tribution of _poverty, not its level. What made the big
reduction in the level of poverty, however, was the actio" bt
hundreds of thousands of businesses to hire the poor during
this period.
Their motivation was certainly volunteerism*volunteer-
ism motivated by profit. Businesses hired people who in less
robust times they would not have employed. They spent
time which they normally would not have spent training and
teaching work habits. Their motivation was not humanitari-
anism but the desire for profit, and the result was that their
efforts enabled the poor to pull themselves up by their own
bootstraps. The poor learned needed skills, -endured hard
labor, turned their backs on welfare and unemployment
insurance, and worked. This was bootstrap improvement
motivated by their own desire for financial gain, just as
desire for financial gain had motivated businesses. Thus
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" propelled both business
and those in poverty to act in their own interests in such a
way that the common good was served.
Had our record rate of economic growth continued in the
1974 to 1981 period, would Lampman's dream of dwindling
poverty have been realized? The answer is definitely yes!-at
least for the early part of the period. A limiting factor was at
work. That 4.2 percent real growth rate we were experienc-
ing was straining the economic system.
The evidence of this was the alarming increase in the rate
of inflation-from a mere 1.5 percent rate in 1960 to a 6.1-
percent rate in 1969 to an 8.8 percent rate in 1973. This
increase wasn't linear, but each plateau was higher than the
last.
While those inflation numbers now seem nostalgically
small, they seemed enormous then. Moreover, the relative
magnitude of inflation quintupled in those 13 years. Hence
one must conclude that while the rising tide 
-does 
indeed
help-to reduce poverty, there can obvious-ly be too much of a
gogd thing. The high and rising inflation o[ that period led to
both natural economic forces and political forces which
undermined that prosperity and brought that economic
golden age to an end.
In this less-than-robust economic period can president
Reagan's call to volunteerism, that is, for business to act in a
socially responsiblg w.ay, successfully reduce poverty?
Let me first deal with the-question of sociafresponsibility
by quoting_from Milton Friedman's Capitalism and'Freedom in
which he discusses the social respor-rsibitity of business. He
-says: 
"There is one and only one social'responsibility of
business-to use its resourcei and engage in activities de-
signed _to increase its profits so long ,s It stays within the
rules of. tlre game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition n'ithout deception or friu?. . . . ^Few trends
could so thoroughly undefmine the very foundation of our
free societl' as the acceptance by corporaie officials of a social
resp.o.nsibilitv other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive
doctrine...."
T.*g points need to be examined here. First, the corpora-
tion belongs to the stockholders. They, in Friedman,s ,uiu*-
point, not corporate officials, should dictate how their
wealth is spent on ventures not necessitated by the enter-
prise. Second, the welfare function of corporation executives
may t* uq the n'elfare function of society, e .g., will corpo-
rate officials make the same choice between ilo*er rate of
increase in price: ulq employment for the disadvantaged
that society n,ould wish them to make? should that choicJbe
theirs to make?
Friedman is being normative, or prescriptive. He is also
being a hard-nosed realist. when ecohomic iimes are tough,
firms make every effort to reduce the cost of productiSn.
fh"I have to-they have no choice. wide-spread volunteer-ism is a fair-weather child. This means that volunteerism
nearly disappears just at the time when economic conditions
are already increasing poverty, thus doubly compounding
the problem.
while Friedman says that corporations should not en-
gage in charity, he does believe that owners of those
corporations should engage in acts of social responsibility,
i.e., they should be the ones involved in the vo[unteerism.
The motivation for these private individuals to engage in
charitable acts is, says Friedmafl, ". . . that I am distressed
by the gight of poverty, and I am benefited by its allevia-
tion." He continues, ". . . but I am benefited equally
whether I or someone else pays for its alleviatiory th"e
benefits of other people's charlty therefore partly accrue to
me. To put it differently, we might all of us be willing to
contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else
did. . . . In small communities publii pressure can-suffice to
realize the_provision even wittr private charity. In the large
impersonal communities that are increasingly coming to
dominate society, it is much more difficult fo1-it to do io."
cenerally, economists call the very real phenomenon Fried-
man describes by the term "free rider"-problem. If we can
ride on someone else's fare, why shouldwe pay?
with this rationale, Friedman, the archetyplcil free enter-
prise,_ small government spokesman, accepts a governmen-
tal role in the care of the poor. whether ybu agiee with his
rationale or not, history amply demonstrates that volunteer-
ism definitely is not the answer to the problem of poverty in
depressed periods. Is the task, ho*ever, too big to be
assigned to government? Can we possibly even raise enough
money in the public sector to eliminate poverty? The answer
is clearly yes, clearly yes, because we hLve alieady done so!
. According to the Social Security administration, all levels
of government spent $85.060 biltion rn1979, the most recent
year for which complete federal, state, and local data are
available, which was _designed to deal directly or indirectly
with-the problems of low income. This total includes spend-
ing- {or pub=lic aid, veteran welfare, public housing, child
welfare, child nutrition, the now defunct oEo-Action pro-
graT, and C.E.T.A. I have not included in this totat tne uig
buck social security, unemployment insurance, or farm
income programs which share similar ends. Had I done so,
the sum spent for income maintenance would have reached
$233 billion, which is three times as large.
. Considering only the $85 billion spent to deal directlywith the problem of poverty, were we simply to distribute
this money to individuals and families in poverty, we could
write a check for $10,526 to every four-person family that is
classified as being in poverty. Since the official poverty level
for such a four-person family was $7 ,253 in 1979, the
available sum is $3,200 more per family than is necessary to
eliminate poverty. Rough calculation shows that only
$67.631, billion would be required to pay poverty-level in-
comes to all those individuals and families who are in
poverty. This is $17.428 billion, or 20 percent, less than the
$85 billion actually spent for that purpose.
These figures, incident ally, were calculated assuming
that those persons in poverty earned no money at all. In fact,
7.792 million of the 19.5 million adults who were in poverty
in 1981 worked. Indeed, 1.6 million of them worked full-
time. You should note that working 2,000 hours at the legal
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour produces a subpoverty
annual income of $6,700. In addition, many poverty-level
persons drart, social security, private pensions, or income
from other nonworking sources. Thus the $67 billion is
considerably more than is necessary to bring the below-
poverty-level population up to poverty threshold incomes.
The problem with eliminating poverty is certainly not acquir-
ing the total resources needed to do the job. It is getting
these resources to those in poverty without reducing theii
desire to work.
Civen the choice between working as a farmworker and
receiving, as does the average farmworker, $8,491for a full
year's work or receiving $10,526 for not working at all, many
farmworkers would choose the latter, the dole . lndeed the
problem with the poor is that they are just like the nonpoor-they
respond to financial incentiaes as do the nonpoor. (This is sup-
ported by the weight of research evidence.) If a merchant's
keeping the store open one more hour per day will net very
little or nothing, the merchant will choose not to work that
extra hour. Similarly, if working nets the poor no more than
not working, they choose not to work. It's that simple.
Knowing this, we administer a "needs test" before we
permit someone to receive welfare. This needs test is de-
signed to determine whether persons really require an
income supplement or whether they could earn an adequate
income on their own. It is largely the expense of administer-
ing this needs test that accounts for why our seemingly
ample poverty expenditure has not eriminated poverty.In a simpler time, administering the needs test wasn,tterrribly coirpt"r, ;,T' ;*nsive. x set of persons closeenough t9 the applicani to know whett er ih;;#ilcantcould really provid^e for himself or herself administered it.There was-hftre questio., or *rri"g";G. The rocal welfareboard (p:blic or private) could aetE.*irie thui th"-rppii.u.,t
needed $30 per month for necessities and wourdr"p'F,it it. Ifthe aid recipient found awayto earn $10, the welfare stipend
Yi.t cut- by $10; the board, being close to the ,Lci'ie.,t,ultimately would have known abo"ut the recipient,s oppor_tunity to work and cut the benefit by $10 whetfr;;1h;;5fi;;
recipient chose to work or not.
Th]s simpler time escaped us, however, with the masspoverty of the 1930s ,.,i tn" -g-;il; concentration ofpoverty in the cities. welfare caml to be"administer"J or, ubroader, less personal scale. Th; pri*rpf" ,;;;i;; thesame, but administration of the needs tesi became ru, *o."difficult and required an army of administrators who wereasked to perform this unpleasant task.
In the mid and late 1^960s a number of economists andother social scientists beg3n to calculate what they .rrrlair,"implicit tax on working #t i.n *u, urro.iaied with our social
fi"lj3::ffograms. Whire benefits *"ru ,"iuced $1 f;; "rr"ryur earned, the implicit tax on,working was essentially 10"0percent. (This is the case with tne #etfare recipient pre_
,"j:TlI noted. Earning $r0_netted her o. ni." ilil;;i'r"o.drncome remained at $30-; Were_ your marginal tax ,?t" 1OOper-cent, would you work more? J '
while we have tried to change such programs in order toreduce such implicit tax rates, -*" hav'e failed because wechanged them piecemeal. The implicit tux on working for themother of an -Aid to Families *itn Dependent Childrenfamily.of -four was rec_ently carcui;t"J l"v tn" president,sCouncil of Economic Advisors to ue s6 p".'.""t. The averageA.F.D.C. mother received a tax equivafent i,r..*"j-#li"A F 
P, C. program that was g6 pi..""ioi tn" amount shewould have earned had she worked full time. This amountsto the grand sum 
?141a per hour net for the mother choosingwork. The recent Reagan reforms hav" 
"ot improved theincentive picture.
According to Tom ]oe of the university of Chicago Center
I'
for the Study of Social Policy, the Reagan reforms are aimed
at strictly applying the means test so that those who can
work wiil nbt receive welfare. This is laudable but indeed
difficult to enforce, given the structure of incentives faced by
aid recipients. Consider the case of the average mother on
A.F.D.C. who chooses to work. Under the Reagan reforms
she would have $q more per month to spend than the
average nonworking mother on A.F.D.C. That is 1L.20 per
hour net for working, based upon an 80-hour, or half-time,
work month. Try to enforce the means test under those
circumstances! There are few jobs so inherently rewarding
that people will work when the economic reward is so trivial.
Put yourself in the shoes of a welfare worker. SupPose a
mother tells you that her preschool children need special
care that only she can provide, hence, she cannot work.
Evaluate this case. Consider the consequences for the chil-
dren if you are wrong! Suppose a recipient informs you that
he or she has a severe back problem. Evaluate that. Can a
blind person work? Will you be an ogre and say he or she
must?
When the reward for work is trivial, people do not work.
This is the r,r,hole notion behind supply side economics, but
the welfare program acts as though the poor do not respond
to financial incentives; and since the welfare system creates
so little financial incentive to work, we are compelled to
spend much time and effort determining who can be self-
supporting. The overall result is the $85 billion plus welfare
expenditure which is insufficient both to bring the poor up to
the poverty income level and to administer the means test.
Thus there are indeed some persons on welfare who do
not choose to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.
They have no incentive to do so, just as that businesswoman
or man who chose not to keep the store oPen an additional
hour had no financial incentive to do so.
Martin Anderson in his book , Welfare, clearly illustrates
this point. Up to an annual income of approximately $10,000,
each additional dollar earned by the average American is
implicitly taxed at a rate of approximately 70 percent. Each
dollar earned beyond the $10,000 threshold is taxed at
approximately 27 percent. The tax rate drops abruptly at
approximately $10,000 because at that income level, eligibil-
ity for most welfare-type programs ends. Dollars earned up
to that point tend to make one ineligible for direct n'elfare
grants and for indirect grants for such items as food stamps,
school lunches, and rent subsidies. Let me state Anderson's
finding again. For each dollar earned up to $10,000 the
combination of taxes paid and n'elfare-type benefits lost
amounts to about 70 cents. Bevond the 510,000 income le'u,el
only 27 cents per dollar are lost to the government.
Anderson says that a "po\rertv n-all" exists at the $10,000
earnings level. The poor don't escape out of poverty because
the penalty is too high: 70 percent of all earnings are taxed
away by the government. Converselr', one gets to keep only
30 cents out of each additional dollar earned.
After reviewing recent attempts to reform welfare pro-
grams, Martin Anderson concludes that onlv two ways exist
to increase work incentives and eliminate the poverty wall:
1) to lower basic welfare pavments or 2) to reduce directly
the rate of welfare grant reductions as income levels rise.
Lowering basic welfare pavments doesn't really eliminate
the poverty wall. It simplv moves the wall from the $10,000
level to a lower level. \Vere all welfare benefits to be
eliminated at the $3,000 income level, for example, many
individuals would be hurdled by their own earnings ability
far enough beyond that point that the povertv wall would be
meaningless for them. Those with no earnings ability would
suffer greatly. Anderson concludes that lowering basic wel-
fare payments by any meaningful amount is politically
impossible. I concur in that judgment.
Anderson also concludes that eliminating the wall by
reducing the rate at which welfare grants fall as incomes rise
is too expensive a method to use. To illustrate first the
mechanism, were the welfare recipient to lose only 30 cents
worth of benefits for each dollar's worth of income earned
instead of 70 cents, the welfare recipient would have nearly
the same incentive to work as does the nonrecipient. Ander-
son bases his conclusion that this method is too expensive on
the large-scale field experiments on the negative income tax
which the federal government has conducted. These studies
have found that broad eligibility for income subsidies by the
federal government induced up to a thirty-five percent
reduction in work effort. In short, income guarantees, even
with reduced grant reductions as incomes increase, appear
to create an overly tempting opportunity for many to work
less. While I disagree with Anderson's interpretation of
much of the negatirie income tax program experimental data,
I reluctantly conclude that programs like the_ negative in-
come tax are no Panacea for overcoming the welfare wall and
getting the poof to pull themselves by their own bootstraps
out of poverty.
Martin Anderson concludes that the only solution which
will create work incentive for those on welfare is to cease
welfare payments to all those who can work but choose not
to do so. This is the same solution that the Reagan adminis-
tration embraces. If they can work, make them do so.
The conservative strands in my heart respond favorably
to the Reagan-Anderson solution. My intellect, however,
tells me that my heart is wrong. The Reagan-Anderson
proposal is merely another call to conduct an effective means
test. I see no reason to believe that we can conduct this test
better no\\' than in the past, that we can cheaply and
correctly separate the work able from the work non-able.
The 
-error 
in the Reagan-Anderson aPproach is that they
believe that the government, through case workers, will
conduct the means test when, in fact, the means test will, as
it has been since local welfare boards disappeared, be
conducted bv the recipient. Recipients who find it is in their
financial self-interest not to wofu, will not work. The pov-
erty-stricken rvho find themselves worse off because they
puiled on their bootstraps will soon cease to exert the effort.
Furthermore, their unprofitable experiment with work will
become an example for others.
Only if u'e were able to return to small-town America
where neighbors knew neighbors, apple pie was made by
Mom and not Hostess, and funds were raised and admin-
istered locally would the Reagan-Anderson solution work.
In the mass society we cannot know whether a stranger has
the ability to n,ork. Enough people can fool the administra-
tors so that a system based upon getting people to do that
which is not in their best interest will not work.
What, then, is the solution? I suggest that we begin by
admitting that the poor are like the rest of us in that they will
not do those things which are harmful to their economic
interests. We must create a system in which it is in the poor's
economic self interest to pull themselves uP by their boot-
straps out of poverty and consequently off welfare.
The experience of the booming sixties clearly tells us that
there are two essential elements In such a system:
1. Business must find it in its economic self interest to hire
the poor, and
2. The-poor must find it in their economic self interest to go
to work.
Both of these essential elements are met by training the
p:o, for occupations_ which are critically needed uy busiiless.
lf bus.inesses find people uith critically neehed skills aiailable, they
will hire them. If individuals harle critically needed ,tittr,
their labor will command such a price that they will find that
work pays better than welfare and choose to work.
My solution-the labor market solution-is of the utmost
simplicity; 
-train-the poor for n'ell paying jobs. For a momentplease let the_solution remain simirle. Aisume that such jobs
do exist and that the poor can be tiained to do them. we witt
deal with those complexities in time.
Examine the simple solution. It recognizes formally that
!h9 poor ultimately cbnduct the means te"st. lf , after training,it is economically worthwhile to choose work over welfare,
tJ]" newly trained will work. The enforcement problem
disappears- and, with rt, the need to spend 
"rio.*o.r,amounts of money for enforcement.
Consider the case of the A.F.D.C. mother with two
children at home. Under a means-tested program we would
either have to acce,pt her argument that irre"needed to stay
home with her children or c-ommand her to work and hang
the consequencel, perhapsliterally. Under this proposal, jol
training would give h_er enhanced earning abilily. witn'tni,
^"ry 
earning ability she might choose on her own to go to
work as do the mothers of many s-mall children. The be"auty
of the solution is that she would choose work only if it were
in her best interest to do so. The more earning capacity
created by job training, the more likely she would 5e to mak-e
the choice to work.
Further, the solution lies right at the heart of the supply
side economics concept which fius so fascinated politiciriJ or
late. To wit, increased productive capacity leads'to increased
production. Increased production meani ir,creased income
and wealth out of which to pay wages. From a supply point
of view this is a production progrlm, not a redisiriuiltio.,
program; and if the poor were truly trained for those critical
jobs where labor shortages exist, even conventional eco-
nomic theory would grant that production and incomes
would increase. The crutch of supply side economics is not
needed to justify such a program.
Now the complexities-
Is job training possible? Haven't we just finished a long
national experiment with the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act program (C.E.T.A.) that shows that job
training doesn't work?
Research evidence now clearly shows that job training
programs in this country have been greatly maligned. Such
programs have truly increased earnings and improved em-
ployment opportunities in spite of the common wisdom that
they have failed. The Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act program has been a success. My own research
on the Kansas C.E.T.A. program shows that it has improved
participants' earnings by approximately 50 percent relative
both to a control group and to their own previous earnings.
Most national evaluations of the C.E.T.A. program also
indicate that the program has increased earnings.
C.E.T.A. lvorks, that is, job training works, because it
lowers the risk associated with employing poverty-group
people and eliminates much of their training cost to employ-
ers. C.E.T.A.'s success could even be improved if all job
training were market-directed instead of bureaucratically
directed. Let me broaden my focus. General education also
accomplishes the same ends and thereby reduces poverty. In
general, the poverty rate ranges from 36.8 percent for those
with no schooling to 8 percent for those having a high school
diploma to 3.7 percent for those with some college educa-
tion. The program I describe would include both job training
and formal education. We now know very little about adult
education in this country, but what we do know shows that
it is extremely effective.
The temptation to take shortcuts to accomplish desired
goals, however, is always present. Many have reasoned that
if job training lowers employment cost and makes the poor
employable, a tax credit equal to some proportion of wages
would do the same thing. A tax credit program would
eliminate the need for bureaucracy and government pro-
grams. Business would simply hire the poor, train them, and
write off a fraction of their employment cost from incometaxes due. Indeed such a tax .rudit'*ourd *o.t *"il exceptfor the same probrem found in werfarl-*,u means test.The only, emproyees for whom such an anti-poverty taxcredit shouid ue givtn to employ"rr-ro, hiring are those.whodo not have thJ means to'gain 
"*ptty-ent themserves.often, howeve., 
1!" emproyer is ailowed to administer themeans test, i.e., to sereit employees. Government checksexist, but a, big problem remain!. It is in the interest ofbusiness to let InL gorrernment subsidize through these taxcredits the emproyrient of persons who are arready produc_tive; business-geis both tf,e Uer.,"fit Lf iu*rir.,g an ilready
tr:*:lil13erson and no training cost. Hence the end resurtrs a business firm on welfare wiih no financiar incentive toget off the dole.
In 1981 a total of $390 m1|ion was spent on the TargetedJobs Tax Credit (T.J.T...) program, a tax credit program like
l.h: "lg 
just desiribed. w"'hui" 
"; ;";;';rabre evaluations ofthis T.I-T.C.. program *ni.n ,r,"*-tn5i i, works to raiseincomes for th^e p5or. The g390 milllon o?irr", foregone dueto T.J.T.C. is, in-my.view, a f";-;?;"bii. corporate welfare.It is not accomprishing_the end desiied.-in" work IncentiveProgram, on the other"hand, whi.h;l;; provides tax cuts toemployers, appears to be 'effecii;;. "ifi, is probabry sobecause o$y werfare recipient, li"-lrigiilr" for the w.r.w.Program, i.e. employers do not sorery'cor.duct the meanstest.
r_ . 
At the present time the choice for many of the poor isbetween a mir
taxi-sq",,"-nffi "ili,[':;i?ffi f,Xi.lf Affi ,n""tfjfiwould be between an ab'o"e-ininimum-*ugu job and wel_fare; as earning ability g;"r up, the impri.it tu, goes down,and the job would be #o." frbquentfy inor"..The second 
,complexity involves in" 
-"*i.tence 
of skillscritically needed !r busin6ss which the irior market cannotprovide. I wilt admit that in this p"iilJ"r 
"rtr"*"rfi,ignunemployment, few such unmet heeds .riri'u"""'rr"ih"present, however, jobs are availabre for office machinerepai-rers and others with speciric tecn"icli skilts.we should not ret the mfopia of thepr"r"r-,t brind us. we
il?iHr,#ir;:it,#,rm*:rn*i{i"f #l*l#j
technology during the 1980s and 1990s. These jobs will
require training.
Furthermore, the demographic changes which we know
will occur in this decade and the next will greatly increase
pressure on the labor market. A labor market with many
i.*", new entrants will be one in which jobs wili be
relatively more abundant. Just as publiS jo! training?ro-
grams worked in the less-than-booming decade of the 1970s,
tfrey will also have an opPortunity to work in the next two
decades.
The final complexity involves the overall level of eco-
nomic activity.
Should the U.S. work force remain as far from full
employment as it now is, a Program of job training will not
eliminate poverty. That requires more economic activity. In
less than a full-employment economy, what this job Program
would do is to reduce the unevenness of the distribution of
poverty across society; that is, poverty would be distributed
iandomly across the population instead of bging visited
differentially on certain groups. Instead of a black poverty
rate higher than the white rate and a female rate greater than
the mile rate, these rates would be more nearly equal.
Everyone would more equally participate in whatever Pros-
perity exists.- 
Second, even in a full-employment economy this Pro-
gram will not get every poverty-level Person into the labor
market. Employment of two grouPs will be excluded,
namely those few who simply will not wolk even if working
would make them financially better off and those who
cannot work (the old, young, physically and mentally dis-
abled).
What this approach would do, however, is gradually to
free up welfare money now used to make Payments to the
poor *ho can work so that the poor who cannot work may be
more adequately supported. job training is inherently self-
financing: welfare goes down and tax receipts increase. My
research has shown that Kansas government income in-
creased enough as the result of C.E.T.A. to pay for the entire
C.E.T.A. stipend to trainees in only seven years. That is a 14
percent return on the investment in job training for the state.- This program will not produce Lampman's dream of
poverty's eradication in a generation. It will take time, but
eventhough]ye are all dead in the long run, as Keynes said,
our children live on. To ever reduce th-e legacy of poverty to
futgle generations is a worthwhile goal. 
u
. I bgg1" by saying that I would ipeak as a labor econo-mist. I do not believe I have s-trayed too far from my
discipline. The principle I have relieci upon has been deliv-
.u,."d j9 *9 by theorr 1nd confirmed by r^esearch: that is, *",the rich, the poor, and those in the middle, respond alile to
economic incentives. Let us use that knowledge to make the
only lasting solution to poverty, the labor mXrket solution,
work.
